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INTENT ELEMENT IN CONTEMPT OF INJUNCTIONS, DECREES

CouRT ORDERs-Recent years have seen increasing effort on the
part of courts to distinguish between civil and criminal contempts. This
effort has been engendered by an awareness of the different procedural
and substantive aspects of the two classifications.1 A discussion of these
aspects, as well as of the tests used to distinguish civil and criminal
contempts, is beyond the scope of this paper. 2 Suffice it to say that those
tests which have been applied leave much to be desired. The lack of
clarity, so evident in prevailing tests, is in part a legacy from early
decisions which permitted the two types of contempt to be intermingled
without distinction and in part the result of inherent difficulties. Punishment for criminal contempt may incidentally have a remedial purpose; conversely, the use of civil contempt may have both the remedial
purpose and the result of vindicating the court's authority. Even courts
that desire to accomplish a separation may therefore find great difficulty
in keeping the two types of contempt entirely distinct.
The nature of the intent required for contempt liability presents a
special problem, necessarily involving a high degree of subjectivity.
The range of possible variation can be compared only to a spectrum. At
one.extreme are violative acts, done with knowledge of the decree, but
with no intent to impair or defy the court's authority; for such acts, the
appropriate remedy is civil contempt. However, when something more
AND

1 See Moskovitz, "Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal,'' 43 CoL. L. RBv.
780-824 (1943); note, 57 YALE L. J. 83 at 107 (1948).
2 See 13 L.R.A. (n.s.) 595 (1908) and 34 L.R.A. (n.s.) 874 (1911).
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is added, it becomes possible to invoke either civil or criminal contempt
proceedings, or possibly both. 3 The problem is to measure this added
subjective element by some clear and meaningful objective test.

A. Intent in Civil Contempt
As the purpose of a civil contempt suit is either to compensate for
losses caused by breach of the injunction or to compel obedience, it is
usually said that no intent to defy the court or impede its process is
necessary. It is enough if defendant violated the terms of ~ unambiguous decree of which he had notice; the only intent necessary is an
intent to do the violative act. 4
Perhaps the remedial nature of civil contempt can be best illustrated
by those cases which hold an employer liable for breach of injunction
by his employee even though the violative acts were done without the
employer's knowledge and against his express commands. 5 Another
illustration is found in the group of cases in which the violation was
due to external elements over which the contemnor had no control.
For example, in Holloway v. Water Co.,6 defendant was forbidden to
let his water tanks overHow on plaintiff's property. Defendant alleged
he had done everything scientifically possible to prevent the overHow
and that he had no intention of violating the decree, but the tanks did
overHow, causing damages to plaintiff's property. Defendant was held
liable for damages in civil contempt proceedings. In another case, defendant was ordered to operate his dam so as to keep the water in Clear
Lake below a certain maximum level ( allowance being made in case
of unusually heavy rains). Due to a sudden storm of unprecedented
intensity, the water quickly rose above the prescribed level. Defendant
was held liable to adjacent owners whose property was damaged by the
3 A refusal to comply with a court order is ordinarily a civil contempt, but if carried
to the point of "contumacy" it becomes a criminal contempt. McCann v. N.Y. Stock
Exchange, (C.C.A. 2d, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 211. "Yet sometimes the disobedience may be
of such a character and in such a manner as to indicate a contempt of the court rather
than a disregard of the rights of the adverse party." Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U.S.
324 at 329, 24 S.Ct. 665 (1904).
4 Root v. Conkling, 108 Misc. 234, 177 N.Y.S. 610 (1919); Thompson v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., 48 N.J. Eq. 105 at 108, 21 A. 182 .(1891); Gage v. Denbow, 49 Hun. 42, l
N.Y.S. 826 (1888); McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 69 S.Ct. 497 (1949);
7 AM. AND ENG. £Ne. 011 LAW, 2d ed., 76 (1898); N.L.R.B. v. Whittier Mills Co., (C.C.A.
5th, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 725.
5 Telling v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 584; Thompson
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 48 N.J. Eq. 105, 21 A. 182 (1891). But cf. the language in
Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, (D.C. ill. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 250 at 258.
a 100 Kan. 414, 167 P. 265 (1917).
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rise of the water even though he was caught by surprise, had neither
foreseen nor contributed to the violation by his own conduct or omission, and intended no harm to plaintiffs.7
Following the logic of the remedial theory of civil contempt punishment, it would appear that the "good faith" of defendant has no
effect on his liability, and most of the cases so hold. At most, it can be
considered to eliminate criminal contempt punishment, but defendant
must still make plaintiff whole or render the required performance. 8
Of course, if the defendant is truly unable to comply with the decree
or order, no punishment could coerce compliance and so the contempt
is excused. 9 However, if lack of good faith is shown; for example, if
defendant, t:J:irough his own fault is unable to comply, ordinary contempt punishment will follow. 10 Defendant's good faith is most commonly proved by showing that his action was taken under advice of
counsel, honestly given and taken, and that there was a reasonable basis
for the advice given. In such cases, courts often say that, although the
contempt is not excused, good faith serves to "mitigate" punishment.11
7 Clear Lake Water Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 710, 92 P. (2d) 921
(1939). However, the court does indicate it thought defendant could have opened its gates
sooner, and perhaps could thereby have prevented the overflow.
8 In addition to cases cited in note 4, supra, see Proudfit Loose Leaf Co. v. Kalamazoo
Loose Leaf Binder Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1915) 230 F. 120; Mathews v. Spangenberg, (C.C.
N.Y. 1883) 15 F. 813; Economist Furnace Co. v. Wrought-Iron Range Co., (C.C. Ind.
1898) 86 F. 1010; Thistlethwaite v. State, 149 Ind. 319, 49 N.E. 156 (1898). Cf. Herring
v. Houston National Exchange Bank, 113 Tex. 337, 255 S.W. 1097 (1923); Sponenburg
v. City of Gloversville, 46 Misc. 290, 94 N.Y.S. 264 (1905).
9 Andrews v. Andrews, 166 Misc. 385, 2 N.Y.S. (2d) 575 (1938); Porter v. Maxwell,
208 Iowa 1224, 266 N.W. 917 (1929); Ex parte Cardella, 47 Cal. App. (2d) 329, 117 P.
(2d) 908 (1941); Tudor v. Firebaugh, 364 ill. 283, 4 N.E. (2d) 393 (1936). The ordinary
case is that in which defendant is unable to pay pursuant to a decree for alimony, where
special constitutional problems are encountered. See 30 A.L.R. 125 (1924). However,
the courts commonly recognize financial inability to comply as a defense to contempt proceedings for failure to pay money pursuant to court order. And, although there are but
few cases in point, it appears that failure to deliver up property pursuant to a_ judgment
will not be punished either by imprisonment or compensatory fine if defendant is actually
unable to produce the property through no fault of his own. Allen v. Woodward, Ill Texas
457, 239 S.W. 602, 22 A.L.R. 1256 (1922); 31 A.L.R. 649 (1924); 40 A.L.R. 546
(1926); 76 A.L.R. 390 (1932); 120 A.L.R. 703 (1939). As to inability of trustee to pay
over or account for funds, see 60 A.L.R. 322 (1929).
10 Haines v. Haines, 35 Mich. 138 (1876); Wartman v. Wartman, (C.C. Md. 1853)
F. Cas. No. 17,210, Taney 362; In re Clift's Estate, 108 Utah 336, 159 P. (2d) 872
(1945). Often it appears that defendant is insolvent and is totally unable to perform, in
which case the only possible punishment is incarceration. The question arises, imprisonment for how long? If for a definite term, it smacks of criminal contempt punishment;
if indefinitely, the sentence may be void as tantamount to life imprisonment.
11 In re Cooley, 95 N.J. Eq. 485, 125 A. 486 (1924); In re Braun, (D.C. Pa. 1919)
259. F. 309; Lustgarden v. Felt-Tarrant Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 277;
Boston and Montana Mining Co v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 24 Mont. 117, 60 P.
807 (1900); Freeman v. Premier Machine Co., (D.C. Mass. 1938) 25 F. Supp 927.

1950]

COMMENTS

863

The situation arises most often where defend~t was enjojped from
infringing plaintiff's patent. It would be illogical to reduce punishment below the compensatory limits, but if plaintiff suffered no real
damages, a nominal :6.ne is proper.12
There are cases which seem to require "wilfulness" of violation for
civil contempt liability-a term usually used to describe criminal contempts. In Grant v. Johnson,1 3 defendant violated an injunction restraining him from operating his kennels and pet hospital so as to
disturb plaintiff's restaurant business by noxious noises and odors. The
court held defendant in contempt of the order, but reconsidered the
case and discharged him, saying, ''The greater weight of testimony
indicates no wilful disobedience of the injunction order on the part
of the defendants."14 In Whipple v. Nelson,1 5 defendant was enjoined
from maintaining a ditch so that accumulated water overflowed on
plaintiff's land. Under the advice of his lawyer and the county surveyor, defendant built two dams. Unusually heavy rains caused water
to overflow the dams and run the old course to plaintiff's land. The
court found that since defendant had not wilfully disobeyed the injunction, no contempt punishment should be imposed. Defendant had,
in good faith, attempted to comply with the purpose of the order. Perhaps the result can be explained by the existence of a statute which
said, "Disobedience of an injunction may be punished as a contempt
by the court. "16
In summary, it can be said that it is no defense to a civil contempt
charge that defendant has no intention to defy the court, or impair the
plaintiff's rights, or that he acted in the good faith belief that he was
not violating the terms of the decree. To require proof of a specific
intent by plaintiff would make effective enforcement of decrees and
redress of injuries exceedingly difficult. The few exceptions to the
general rule may be explained as attempts by the courts to avoid the
harshness of the contempt remedy, especially where the alleged contemnor was obviously innocent of any wrongful intent, the violation
occurred despite his honest efforts, or the plaintiff has suffered no
appreciable injury by the breach.
12 Strawberry

Island Co. v. Cowles, 79 Misc. 279, 140 N.Y.S. 333 (1912).

1s 272 App. Div. 968, 71 N.Y.S. (2d) 529 (1947).
14 272

App. Div. 1085, 74 N.Y.S. (2d) 751 (1947).
138 Neb. 514, 293 N.W. 382 (1940). Cf. the illustration given by the court in
Thompson v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 48 N.J. Eq. 105 at 108, 21 A. 182 (1891).
16 Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) §20-1072. Italics supplied.
15
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B. Intent in Criminal Court
The intent of the contemnor is the factor which serves to convert
a mere civil contempt of plaintiff's rights into a criminal contempt of
court.17 The purpose of the proceeding is to punish, as for a crime, a
wrong to the public represented by their courts, to discourage future
contempts, and to uphold the dignity and authority of the judicial
process.18 Whether merely awarding the plaintiff his remedy in a civil
contempt suit will sufficiently accomplish these ends,1 9 or whether
additional, punitive measures are called for, 20 must rest with the court's
discretion. And the only guide to the exercise of that discretion is a
vague notion as to the purpose of contempt punishment. Perhaps the
various tests used to determine the existence of the requisite wrongful
intent are as subjective as the state of mind they seek to measure. 21 But
the court must -find something more than a bare intent to violate the
court order to bring into play the sanctions of criminal contempt. 22 It
is submitted that gross negligence is not enough, despite occasional
intimations to the contrary.23
The word most commonly used to characterize the state of mind
which converts a civil contempt into a criminal contempt is that most
11 Bigelow v. R.K.O. Pictures, (D.C. ill. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 250 at 254; Denny v.
State, 203 Ind. 682 at 691, 182 N.E. 313 (1932); In re Howell and Ewing, 273 Mo. 96,
200 S.W. 65 (1918); Proudfit Loose Leaf Co. v. Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder Co., (C.C.A.
6th, 1915) 230 F. 120 at 132 and 133.
18 People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer and Terminer, 101 N.Y. 245 at 248 (1886);
Thompson v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 48 N.J. Eq. 105 at 108, 21 A. 182 (1891); In re
Rice, (C.C. Ala. 1910) 181 F. 217 at 220; People ex rel. Kelly v. Aitken, 26 Hun. (N.Y.)
327 at 329 (1879).
rn E.g.: Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, (D.C. ill. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 250 at 258;
Mathews v. Spangenberg, (C.C. N.Y. 1883) 15 F. 813.
20E.g., see note 3, supra, and State v. Marron, 22 N.M. 632 at 640, 167 P. 9 (1917);
L.R.A., 1918B, 217.
21 For various judicial expressions characterizing the state of mind necessary for a
criminal contempt, see the following: Proud/it Loose Leaf Co. v. Kalamazoo Loose Leaf
Binder Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1915) 230 F. 120 at 132; In re Presentment by Grand Jury of
Stetser, (D.C. Del. 1942) 45 F. Supp 556 at 557; People ex rel. Kelly v. Aitken, 26 Hun.
(N.Y.) 327 at 329 (1879); Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682 at 704, 182 N.E. 313 (1932);
In re Home Discount Co., (D.C. Ala. 1906) 147 F. 538 at 555; State ex rel. Indianapolis
Bar Assn. v. Fletcher Trust Co., 211 Ind. 27 at 37, 5 N.E. (2d) 538 (1937); People v.
Solomon, 150 Misc. 873 at 878, 271 N.Y.S. 136 (1934); In re Ft. Lee, 108 N.J. Eq. 425 at
427, 155 A. 473 (1931); Dodge v. State, 140 Ind. 284 at 288, 39 N.E. 745 (1895).
22 One notable exception: public policy and effective enforcement of liquor laws indicate
strict criminal contempt liability for violation of a ''liquor injunction." Donato v. United
States, (C.C.A. 3d, 1931) 48 F. (2d) 142; Nies v. Anderson, 149 Iowa 326, 161 N.W.
316 (1917); State v. Ramsey, 151 Kan. 764, 100 P. (2d) 637 (1940).
2a United States v. Ford, (D.C. Mont. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 990; Limerick v. Riback,
204 Mo. App. 321, 224 S.W. 45 (1920).
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annoying word "wilful."24 As if to heap equivocation upon equivocation, the word appears in most criminal contempt statutes.25 It should
be noted that the only effective control over the trial court's determination that defendant "wilfully" disregarded the mandate of the court is
the slim possibility of reversal for abuse of discretion. 26
Ascertaining the existence of sufficient wrongful intent in cases of
violations of decrees and orders presents a much more difficult problem
than is found in the direct contempt and contempt by publication
cases. There the court has the benefit of first-hand knowledge of the
words or acts of the contemnor, and can determine with reasonable
accuracy the intent with which they were uttered or done. 27 As a
result, the intent to contemn is usually apparent from the act done or
language used, which is said to be wrongful per se, and it is only when
the act is of "doubtful propriety" that an inquiry into defendant's state
of mind becomes necessary. 28
To apply the same measuring criteria in cases where an order made
for plaintiff's benefit has been violated is extremely dangerous, for in
the mine-run case there will be no accompanying words or acts indicative
of the actor's intent. And yet to demand proof of defendant's wrongful
state of mind would emasculate the contempt power. Apparently the
policy of maintaining the effectiveness of contempt proceedings has
prevailed, for it is generally held that intent may be inferred from the
act-defendant is presumed to intend the natural and probable conse24 The following quotation indicates a few of the many ways in which the word "wilful"
may be used: ''The word [wilful] often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing,
or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it
generally means an act done with a bad purpose ••. without justifiable excuse ..• stubbornly,
obstinately, perversely. • • • The word is also employed to characterize a thing done without
ground for believing it is lawful ••. or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or
not one has a right so to act•••." United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 at 394-395,
54 S.Ct. 223 (1933).
25 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §3-903 (1078); N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1944) Penal Law §600; Cal. Penal Code (1949) §166; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1943) §5-1(5);
Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) §20-2121.
20 See May Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, Montana, (C.C.A. 9th, 1933)
64 F. (2d) 450; In re Moore, 93 Cal. App. 488, 269 P. 664 (1928); Caldwell v. United
States, (C.C.A. 9th, 1928) 28 F. (2d) 684.
21 Dodge v. State, 140 Ind. 284 at 288, 39 N.E. 745 (1895); Dale v. State, 198 Ind.
llO at 123, 150 N.E. 781 (1926); In re Creely, 8 Cal. App. 713, 97 P. 766 at 768 (1908);
Lancaster, Ticer and Trevathan v. State, 208 Ark. 412 at 415, 186 S.W. (2d) 673 (1945);
State v. Kayser, 25 N.M. 245 at 255, 181 P. 278 (1919); Conley v. United States, (C.C.A.
8th, 1932) 59 F. (2d) 929 at 935; In re Terry, (C.C. Cal. 1888) 36 F. 419.
28 See May Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, Montana, (C.C.A. 9th, 1933)
64 F. (2d) 450.
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quences of his act. 29 As in the direct contempt cases, some acts are
considered contemptuous per se, and little opportunity is given defendant to show lack of intent to defy the court's authority.30
Other courts, with an eye to the inherent danger and possibility of
injustice in too readily inferring "criminal" intent, may require a showing of wrongful intent beyond a reasonable doubt,31 or perhaps will be
quick to excuse defendant if his acts are capable of a construction consistent with innocence. 32 The philosophy underlying such holdings is
ably set forth in Weeks v. Smith: 33 "The disobedience complained of
must be 'wilful'. If the order be ambiguous or doubtful, or fairly capable of a construction which will consist with the person's innocence of
any intentional disrespect to the court, I think the court should not
interfere to punish for a contempt. Otherwise, this most salutary remedy which was intended, and should be used, only to maintain the
dignity and efficiency of the court, might degenerate into a trap to catch
the unwary and vex and annoy the innocent."
Practically all courts recognize an affirmative showing of good faith
as relieving defendant of all criminal contempt liability.34 The problem
29 "If a man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances known to
him, and that conduct is forbidden by the law under those circumstances, he intentionally
breaks the law in the only sense in which the law ever considers intent." Holmes, J. in
Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246 at 257, 27 S.Ct. 600 (1906). See Wartman v.
Wartman, (C.C. Md. 1853) F. Cas. No. 17,210, Taney 362 at 370; In re Rice, (C.C. Ala.
1910) 181 F. 217 at 223; In re Home Discount Co., (D. C. Ala. 1906) 147 F. 538 at 555;
Swepson v. United States, (C.C.A. 6th, 1918) 251 F. 205 at 208, 163 Cust. App. 361;
United States v. P. and W. Coat Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 792; Selowsky v.
Superior Court, 180 Cal. 404, 181 P. 652 (1919); Levinstein v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co., (D.C. Del. 1919) 258 F. 662; United States v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 168; In re Creely, 8 Cal. App. 713, 97 P. 766 at 768
(1908).
30 In re Rice, (C.C. Ala. 1910) 181 F. 217 at 223; Matter of North v. Foley, 149 Misc.
572 at 574, 267 N.Y.S. 572 (1933); Kayser v. Fitzgerald, 109 Misc. 27, 178 N.Y.S. 130
(1919); In re Parker, 177 N.C. 463, 99 S.E. 342 (1919).
31 See In re Rice, (C.C. Ala. 1910) 181 F. 217 at 227-228; Sawyer v. Hutchinson,
149 Iowa 93 at 94, 127 N.W. 1089 (1910); Norwood v. Ray Mfg. Co., 11 Civ. Prac. R.
273 at 278 (1886).
82 See In re Rice, (C.C. Ala. 1910) 181 F. 217 at 228; Matter of North v. Foley, 149
Misc. 572 at 574, 267 N.Y.S. 572 (1933); United States v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 168; In re Singer, 109 N.J. Eq. 103, 156 A. 427 (1931).
33 3 Abb. Prac. (N.Y.) 211 at 212-213 (1856).
34 In addition to the cases cited in note 16, supra, see N.L.R.B. v. Bell Oil and Gas
Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 405; People ex rel. Attorney General v. Jersin, 101
Colo. 406, 74 P. (2d) 668 (1937). But see the following cases declaring that "good faith"
may be considered only in mitigation of punishment: In re Ft. Lee, 108 N.J. Eq. 425, 155
A. 473 (1931); State v. Marron, 22 N.M. 632 at 640, 167 P. 9 (1917); State v. Kayser, 25 N.M. 245, 181 P. 278 (1919); Levinstein v. E. I Du Pont De Nemours & Co., (D.C.
Del. 1919) 258 F. 662; Eustace v. Lynch, (C.C.A. 9th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 652; Nies v.
Anderson, 179 Iowa 326, 161 N.W. 316 (1917); United States v. Johnson, (D.C. N.Y.
1943) 52 F. Supp. 382.
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is how to establish "good faith" or lack of disrespectful intent to the
court's satisfaction. It was once held that a sworn denial of intent to
contemn would purge a criminal contempt.35 But the only remedy
against a false affiant was a perjury proceeding, which was not sufficiently effective to discourage untruthfulness and maintain the efficiency of the contempt power. Consequently, the doctrine is generally
rejected today, 36 although sometimes recognized in a modified form by
a few courts which hold that where the acts are ambiguous, so that
intent becomes crucial, the contempt may be purged by a sworn disclaimer of improper intent.37 Even this vestigal remainder is rejected
by many courts38 and given but slight cognizance by others.39
The most common method of establishing "good faith" is to show
that the action was taken under advice of reputable counsel, honestly
given and accepted; that, although counsel was mistaken, there was
some basis for his opinion; and that defendant actually believed his acts
constituted no violation of the order.40 The rationale of this excuse is
explained by the court in People ex rel. Kelly v. Aitken: 41 "If, for
example, one, after careful examination, wrongly interpret, and through
his mistake, disobey an order, the majesty of the law is not offended,
nor the dignity of the court impaired; and, as he is innocent of wilful
offense, the infliction of punishment could have no justification."
Other commonly accepted ways of establishing "good faith" are
(1) proof of insanity,42 (2) showing that the violative act occurred
through mere inadvertence and through no fault of defendant, 43 (3)
35 8 AM. AND ENG. ENc. oP I.Aw, 2d ed., 74 (1898).
36 Dale v. State, 198 Ind. llO, 150 N.E. 781 (1926); In re Terry, (C.C. Cal. 1888)
36 F. 419; United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 at 574, 27 S.Ct. 165 (1906).
37 See 9 L.R.A. (n.s.) lll9 (1907) and L.R.A. 1917E, 650; United States v. Shipp,
203 U.S. 563, 27 S.Ct. 165 (1906); Lancaster, Ticer and Trevathan v. State, 208 Ark.
412, 186 S.W. (2d) 673 (1945); State ex rel. Indianapolis Bar Assn. v. Fletcher Trust
Co., 211 Ind. 27 at 34, 5 N.E. (2d) 538 (1937).
38 See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 at 19, 53 S.Ct. 465 (1932) overruling United
States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 27 S.Ct. 165 (1906) on this point.
39 See In re Rice, (C.C. Ala. 1910) 181 F. 217 at 228; State v. Marron, 22 N.M.
632 at 640, 167 P. 9 (1917). On the subject of purgation by oath and its present day
implications, generally, see Curtis, "The Story of A Notion In The Law Of Criminal Contempt," 41 HARV. L. R.Ev. 51 (1927).
40 Matter of North v. Foley, 149 Misc. 572, 267 N.Y.S. 572 (1933); Proudfit Loose
Leaf Co. v. Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1915) 230 F. 120 at 133;
Wartman v. Wartman, (C.C. Md. 1853) F. Cas. No. 17,210, Taney 362; Mathews v.
Spangenberg, (C.C. N.Y. 1883) 15 F. 813; Furrer v. Nebraska Bldg. and Investment Co.,
109 Neb. 1, 189 N.W. 295 (1922); In re Home Discount Co., (D.C. Ala. 1906) 147 F. 538.
4126 Hun. (N.Y.) 327 at 329 (1879).
42 People v. Burt, 257 Ill. App. 60 (1930).
43 Matter of North v. Foley, 149 Misc. 572 at 574, 267 N.Y.S. 572 (1933); United
States v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 168; Strawberry
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proof of actual inability to comply with the order,44 and ( 4) showing
that defendant is one whose veracity is not to be doubted, and that there
was some reasonable explanation for his act. 45
There are other cases in which the courts were convinced that
there was no disrespectful intent, and therefore no need for criminal
contempt punishment. Although these cases do not fall into welldefined categories, they are illustrative of possible ways in which the
burden of demonstrating good faith may be satisfied. In People v.
Bouchard,46 defendant succeeded in convincing the court that he violated an injunction solely for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the statute pursuant to which it had been issued: And in Hutton v. Superior Court,4 7 defendant was enjoined from intimidating
plaintiff's patrons. Defendant was excused because he had no knowledge that a person arrested by him was one of plaintiff's customers.
Conclusion
The basic difficulty with the contempt decisions lies in the broad
nature of the power, whose exercise depends almost entirely on judicial discretion. The desideratum is a clear and uniform expression of
the purpose of and means of distinguishing civil and criminal contempt
proceedings. For example, if courts would remember that a civil contempt suit is simply another remedy available to a damaged injunction
plaintiff, and that a criminal contempt suit is but a means of deterring
future violations by punishing past offenses, thereby upholding the
dignity and effectiveness of the court and its process, they could more
readily label a proceeding at the outset. Then the particular intent to
be required, if any, could be determined.
Island Co. v. Cowles, 79 Misc. 279 at 290, 140 N.Y.S. 333 (1912); Bigelow v. R.K.O.
Radio Pictures, (D.C. Ill. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 250 at 258.
44 Hansborough v. State, 193 Miss. 461 at 466, 10 S. (2d) 170 (1942); Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 68 S.Ct. 401 (1948), noted in 46 MxcH. L. REv. 933 (1948). But if
the present inability to comply was caused by the wrongful act of defendant, criminal contempt punishment may be imposed. Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230 at 240 (1873).
45 This category seems to be limited to such persons as judges and other public officials
who deny disrespect to the court. For example, see In re Perkins, (D.C. N.C. 1900) 100 F.
950 (defendant a deputy marshal who refused to execute a warrant, though with good
reason, in a rather insolent letter to a U.S. commissioner); In re Smith, 2 Cal. App. 158,
83 P. 167 (1905) and Ryan v. Busick, 50 Cal. App. 26, 194 P. 514 (1920) (both involving
judges who violated writs of mandamus which had been discharged by the appellate court,
though remittiturs had not yet been filed); Havemeyer v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. 267, 25 P.
433 (1890) (defendant a judge who, on the advice of counsel, believed he could not lawfully
obey the writ of prohibition).
46 6 Misc. 459, 27 N.Y.S. 201 (1894).
47 147 Cal. 156, 81 P. 409 (1905).
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Although no particular intent is necessary for a civil contempt,
beyond the intent to do the violative act, some damage to the plaintiff
should be shown and the remedy shaped accordingly. It is submitted
that the power to punish as for a civil contempt should be sparingly
exercised when other, less stringent remedies are available.
The problem of intent in criminal contempt is more difficult to
assess, since past tests to determine the existence of the requisite intent
have been as subjective as the state of mind they seek to measure. However, some uniformity might be attained if each court carefully considers the harshness of the punishment and the purpose of the penalty.
Thus far, lip service has been given to the statement that some intent
to bring the court into disrespect is a prerequisite to criminal contempt
liability. However, close examination of the cases reveals that punishment has often been imposed where the presence of such intent might
be doubted. In such cases the explanation given is that wrongful
intent may be inferred from the act. It is submitted that the courts
should recognize the existence of a power to punish as for a criminal
contempt in cases of violations where it appears necessary to deter
future violations of a similar nature. There would then be two bases
for criminal contempt liability: (1) violation of a decree or order plus
a proved intent to impair judicial authority, and (2) violation of a
decree or order under circumstances which indicate a need for punishment as a warning to prospective violators similarly situated. This
proposed solution, while no panacea, would have the merit of clarifying the rationale of punishment in a particular case, and yet would
preserve the necessary amount of discretion in the trial court.

Edward W. Rothe, S.Ed.

